
On November 11, Morgan Stanley removed Nvidia from its semiconductor “Top Picks” list but maintained its “Overweight” rating and $300 price target. Two days later, Jensen Huang officially resigned as CEO. In an updated report, Morgan Stanley described the event as a “major setback” and lowered its price target to $267, while keeping its “Overweight” rating unchanged. According to a recent tally by Cailian Press, at least 10 leading Wall Street analysts have downgraded Nvidia from “Buy” to “Hold.” Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, RBC and other institutions have lowered their price targets, while Bernstein slashed its target from $400 to $200. Morgan Stanley is among the few institutions in this group that have not turned bearish.

A “Major Setback” and an “Overweight” Rating Can Coexist
Morgan Stanley’s wording is precise. “Major setback” acknowledges the material impact of Huang’s departure: over the past decade, he led a series of innovations across hardware, software, networking, computing and storage. Rapid decision-making, proactive supply chain management and ready accessibility to customers and investors were all defining features of his tenure. These are assets that no earnings report can replace.
However, retaining the “Overweight” rating means Morgan Stanley views this as a leadership shock rather than a breakdown in fundamentals. The distinction rests less on how important Huang is than on what Nvidia needs him to do over the next 12 to 24 months. Morgan Stanley’s answer is: not very much. The supply chain and product pipeline are already locked in, the Vera Rubin platform is ramping up, most orders for the next 12 months have been secured through prepayments, and Rubin Ultra’s product specifications are largely complete. During this period, Nvidia’s core task is to execute its established roadmap rather than chart a new direction—and execution depends far less on the founder personally than pioneering does. This is the underlying logic behind Morgan Stanley’s decision to maintain “Overweight”: Nvidia needs Huang less in the short term than it does over the long term.
Why the Forecasts Were Cut
Morgan Stanley lowered its FY28 and FY29 data center revenue forecasts by approximately 10% each. Its FY28 revenue forecast fell from $69.02 billion to $62.298 billion, while FY29 was reduced from $97.02 billion to $86.67 billion. The FY28 non-GAAP earnings per share forecast was cut from $15.01 to $13.37, and projected FY28 revenue growth was lowered from 70% to 53.5%.
Morgan Stanley’s own description of these cuts deserves a close reading: “We are confident that we have cut to an overly conservative number.” Compared with the company’s previous guidance for 70% shipment growth and 100% demand growth, the new 53.5% growth forecast “leaves considerable room for flexibility, but given the uncertainty and multiple rounds of downgrades, we would rather err on the side of caution.”
There are two drivers behind the cuts, and Morgan Stanley treats them separately. Export controls are an independent variable unrelated to the CEO transition. The bank noted bipartisan momentum in the United States toward further tightening chip export restrictions on China, with that trend accelerating noticeably during the week the report was published. Succession uncertainty, meanwhile, is a direct consequence of the CEO transition. In Morgan Stanley’s model, however, it is reflected through a higher discount rate rather than “lower revenue.” The reduction in the price target from $300 to $267 corresponds to a lower valuation multiple applied to the same cash flow projections, rather than lower cash flow itself.
The two developments occurred within the same period, but their mechanisms differ: export controls reduce the absolute level of revenue, while succession uncertainty raises the price paid for that revenue. Morgan Stanley incorporates both into its model but distinguishes between them in its assessment. The former is a real, quantifiable downside risk; the latter is a probability-based uncertainty that can be resolved over time.
The “Interim CEO” Status Is What Morgan Stanley Is Really Pricing In
CFO Colette Kress has been appointed interim CEO. Morgan Stanley’s assessment of her is positive: “An excellent CFO who can manage the transition effectively.” Immediately afterward, however, the report identifies the practical problem with the word “interim”: “The interim designation could create challenges in securing customer commitments, arranging joint financing for major investments and obtaining approval for strategic plans.”
Morgan Stanley’s conclusion is direct: “Given the pace of AI development and the complexity of Nvidia’s planning, we believe appointing a permanent CEO as soon as possible should be a top priority.” The implication is that every additional quarter under an interim CEO adds another quarter of friction costs across those three types of transactions. Morgan Stanley does not say that “an interim CEO will cause revenue to decline,” but it introduces “the duration of the interim arrangement” as an independent pricing variable in its analytical framework.
Regarding potential successors, Morgan Stanley names data center business head Ian Buck as “the internal candidate we hear mentioned most often,” noting that he is “well known to customers, supply chain partners and some investors.” Yet the admission that follows is unusually direct: “We have absolutely no idea what his strategic vision as CEO would be, or even whether he wants the position.”
Nvidia has never established a publicly visible succession pipeline. Huang has long managed the company through a flat structure with 60 direct reports and no clearly designated second-in-command. Bernstein’s analyst offered a sharper assessment: “How can you have the world’s most valuable company without any succession plan, or even anyone being groomed as a successor?”
Morgan Stanley does not attempt to fill this information gap. It chooses to acknowledge what it does not know, then factor that lack of knowledge into its valuation as a risk. This follows the same logic as its preference to “err on the side of caution” in revenue forecasts: when uncertainty cannot be quantified, conservative assumptions are themselves a form of pricing.
What Morgan Stanley’s “Overweight” Rating Is Betting On
Putting these layers together, Morgan Stanley’s full rationale for maintaining “Overweight” is as follows: the revenue impact of tighter export controls has already been adequately reflected in the approximately 10% forecast reduction; concerns over CUDA’s competitive moat have been overstated, and the CEO transition has not undermined market share stability; the supply chain and product pipeline for the next 12 to 24 months are already locked in, meaning near-term execution does not depend on Huang’s personal relationships; and the current share price already reflects a “major setback” but does not account for the recovery potential once the interim arrangement ends and a permanent CEO is appointed. The $267 price target implies approximately 61% upside, pricing in a reduction in uncertainty rather than a renewed acceleration in growth.
What Morgan Stanley does not answer, however, is when a permanent CEO will be appointed and who that person will be. It acknowledges that it does not know Ian Buck’s strategic vision and offers no estimate of the succession timetable. This means the central catalyst behind the “receding uncertainty” trade is itself a variable without a timeline. Morgan Stanley expresses its directional view through “Overweight,” but does not signal urgency through a “Top Pick” designation. Removing Nvidia from its Top Picks list on November 11, then maintaining “Overweight” while cutting its price target on November 13, conveys a combined message: the bank remains positive on the outlook, but does not see this as a moment to concentrate its bets.
Nvidia will release its FY27 third-quarter earnings after the market closes on November 18, with Kress hosting the earnings call as interim CEO. The market expects quarterly revenue of approximately $109 billion and earnings growth of around 90% year over year. The figures in this report are unlikely to disappoint. What investors really need to listen for is not revenue and profit, but Kress’s comments on the progress of the permanent CEO search and management’s specific quantification of tighter export controls. Morgan Stanley’s framework has already placed these two questions at the center of its valuation. The remaining question is: when will Nvidia itself provide the answers?